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Abstract 
This document describes the need and justification for the development 
of a design guide for safety-relevant computer-based systems.  This 
document also makes a contribution toward the design guide by presenting 
an overview of computer-based systems design, lifecycle, and safety.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................ v 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Purpose ............................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3. Approach ............................................................................................................................................ 3 
2. System Design, Lifecycle, and Safety ...................................................................................................... 5 
2.1. System Design.................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1.1. Environment ................................................................................................................................ 5 
2.1.2. Function, Behavior, and Service ................................................................................................. 5 
2.1.3. Structure ...................................................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.4. Informational, Logical, and Physical Layers .............................................................................. 7 
2.1.5. Hardware and Software Layers ................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.6. Logical Processes ........................................................................................................................ 8 
2.1.6.1. Data Flow ............................................................................................................................................. 8 
2.1.6.2. Control Flow ........................................................................................................................................ 9 
2.1.6.3. State and Event .................................................................................................................................... 9 
2.1.6.4. Sequential Machines, Time and Triggers............................................................................................. 9 
2.1.6.5. Event Timing ..................................................................................................................................... 10 
2.1.6.6. Value and Timing Uncertainty ........................................................................................................... 11 
2.1.7. Interfaces ................................................................................................................................... 11 
2.1.7.1. Physical Interfaces ............................................................................................................................. 12 
2.1.7.2. Logical Interfaces .............................................................................................................................. 12 
2.1.8. Functional Modes ...................................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.9. Composition .............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.2. System Lifecycle .............................................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.1. System Lifecycle and Stakeholders ........................................................................................... 15 
2.2.2. Operational Needs Analysis and Concept Development .......................................................... 16 
2.2.3. System Requirements ................................................................................................................ 17 
2.2.4. System Architecture .................................................................................................................. 18 
2.2.5. Development Lifecycle ............................................................................................................. 20 
2.2.6. Refinement and Evolution ......................................................................................................... 22 
2.3. System Safety ................................................................................................................................... 23 
3. Final Remarks ......................................................................................................................................... 28 
References ................................................................................................................................................... 29 
 
  
v 
 
Abbreviations 
ConOps Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
DIMA Distributed Integrated Modular Architecture 
DMA Direct Memory Access 
DPS Data Processing System 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
FSM Finite State Machine 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IKIWISI I’ll-know-it-when-I-see-it 
IMA Integrated Modular Avionics 
IoP Index of Performance 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
MIL-STD Military Standard 
NAS National Airspace 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
SOI System Of Interest 
SS Sub-System 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
V&V Validation and Verification 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
1.   Introduction 
An aircraft consists of a collection of systems performing a wide variety of functions with different 
safety criticality levels.  The aviation industry is experiencing an ongoing, decades-old trend of adopting 
increasingly sophisticated computer-based technology to implement aircraft functionality.  Modern aircraft 
are highly complex, functionally integrated, network-centric systems of systems [1].  The design and 
analysis of distributed-computation systems like the ones used on aircraft are inherently complex activities.  
Ensuring that such systems are safe and comply with existing airworthiness regulations is costly and time-
consuming as the level of rigor in the development process, especially the validation and verification 
activities, is determined by considerations of system complexity and safety criticality.  A significant degree 
of care and deep insight into the operational principles of these systems are required to ensure adequate 
coverage of all design implications relevant to system safety.   
1.1.   Background 
Aircraft have used digital and software-based electronics since the 1960s [2].  The first avionics 
architectures were in the form of custom-made line replaceable units (LRU) with each LRU performing a 
single function.  These architectures allocated dedicated physical resources (computing processors, 
communication, input sensors and output effectors) to each function, and the LRUs were either completely 
independent of each other or exchanged limited amounts of data [3].  Later, so-called federated architectures 
retained the allocation of one function per LRU but showed a higher level of integration mostly by 
increasing the data exchange between functions through dedicated one-way data links or shared 
communication data buses [4].  Beginning in the 1990s, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) architectures 
were introduced to address market forces that drove the need to reduce the volume, weight, power and 
maintenance cost of avionics systems [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].  The fundamental characteristic of IMA 
architectures is the sharing of resources between functions on a distributed computational platform.  The 
initial examples of the IMA concept consisted of centralized cabinets with multiple simple modules (or 
even just electronic cards) performing specific tasks like processing, networking, data storage and input-
output from sensors and effectors [10].  These resources are shared among various airplane functions that 
run on the platform as time-sharing processes.  These architectures used local backplane buses for 
communication between modules in the same cabinet and single-source data links or shared buses for 
communication cabinet-to-cabinet or between cabinets and separate LRUs.  Thus, at a global level, the 
communication network is segmented and uses gateways for transferring data between segments.  More 
recent IMA architectures connect the modules to a common switch-based data network that handles the 
routing of data messages to their intended destinations [6], [9], [11].  This architectural model can be 
characterized as a distributed IMA (DIMA) with a high degree of functional integration on a platform of 
physically distributed computation and input-output modules (or remote data concentrators), and may 
include federated LRUs on the same network [12]. 
The main drivers for the evolution of avionics architectures are the competition among airlines in the 
air travel market and the competition among airplane manufacturers to meet the demands from the airlines 
for more fuel-efficient and cost-effective airplanes that have more functionality and higher sophistication 
[5], [6], [7], [13].  Over time, functionality has been added to improve airplane flight performance and 
safety, as well as to improve maintenance and passenger comfort [11].  The greatest enabler to the evolution 
of avionics architectures has been advancements in electronics and computer technology, including 
microprocessors, operating systems, data networking, sensors, displays and design development tools [14].  
As technology has improved, the cost of electronic hardware components has decreased, but so has their 
lifecycle duration.  Simultaneously, the ever-increasing functional complexity is being implemented mostly 
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in software, prompting greater interest in ways to simplify software development.  System cost and 
considerations of hardware part obsolescence and software reuse have driven system developers toward 
layered and modular designs with standardized interfaces and generic hardware and software commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) components where practicable.  As functionality has increased, software development 
and system integration have become the primary cost factors.    
In addition to functional requirements, aircraft avionics systems must satisfy demanding quality 
requirements for performance, dependability and safety under stated operational and environmental 
conditions [15], [16], [17], [18], [19].  A system is safety-relevant if its failure can endanger human life, 
property or the environment [20], [21].  The main goal behind system safety requirements is to ensure an 
acceptable and rational inverse relation between the probability and severity of functional failures [22].  A 
system can experience internal perturbations due to logical faults (i.e., defects) from design errors 
introduced during system development, or physical faults introduced during system development or 
operation [23].  The basic approach for dealing with these threats to the quality of the services delivered by 
a system consists of fault prevention and removal, as well as the use of redundancy supported by fault and 
error containment techniques (e.g., isolation, separation, partitioning, dissimilarity, selection, and voting) 
to mitigate the propagation of fault effects [22], [23], [24], [25].  Older federated avionics systems had 
logical dependencies that were simple to manage and physical barriers that prevented the propagation of 
effects between architecture-level components, but modern functionally integrated architectures with more 
resource sharing and intricate data exchange patterns have a higher risk of unintended interactions between 
components.  Most of the complexity in modern aircraft systems stems from these requirements for high 
functional quality while protecting against potential failures due to physical or logical defects, or misuse 
[1]. 
A system is said to be complex when its operation, failure modes or failure effects are difficult to 
comprehend without the aid of analytical methods [25].  The complexity of some systems is such that they 
cannot be analyzed and understood well enough to be managed effectively by any one individual or small 
groups.  System complexity has many aspects, including task structure (i.e., the sequencing and timing of 
actions to achieve a goal), predictability (i.e., randomness in the effects of system actions), size (i.e., the 
number of components and functions), and algorithmic complexity (including space and time requirements 
of computations and cognitive complexity) [26], [27].  Distributed safety-critical systems require complex 
algorithms for achieving and preserving distributed coordination and consistency even when operating with 
faulty components [28].  In general, complex interactions between components (including both hardware 
and software components) have a higher potential for execution errors.  This threat can be aggravated by 
coupling between components that allows the propagation of fault effects along paths of data and control 
information flow.  With complex integrated systems, there is also the possibility of unintended coupling 
through shared resources and the logical and physical environment in which the system operates.   
Uncertainty about the interactions and coupling between components in complex computer-based 
aircraft systems, especially under failure conditions, is a recognized point of concern for certification 
authorities because of the possible safety implications [29].  It is known that using testing and statistical 
techniques are not feasible approaches to quantify the reliability of software at the levels required for safety-
critical applications [30].  Likewise, it may not be possible to develop a test suite for complex computer-
based systems to demonstrate the absence of requirements and design errors [24].  Because of the present 
inability to ascertain the completeness and correctness of the requirements and design of complex systems, 
the current state of practice relies heavily on assessments of the process used to develop the system to 
achieve an adequate confidence that errors have been identified and corrected [25], [31], [32], [33].  
However, industry, academia and certification authorities recognize that development process assurance 
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alone may not be sufficient to establish that safety objectives are adequately satisfied [30], [24].  Safety 
engineering and evidence-based approaches have been proposed and are being investigated as a way to 
increase confidence in the safety of complex computer-based systems [30], [34], [35]. 
The validation and verification (V&V) and the certification of complex computer-based systems, 
including safety-critical systems, are recognized problems of national significance [31], [36], [37].  The 
challenges in assuring the design and safety of systems need considerable attention and financial investment 
[38].  As the complexity of systems continues to increase, the V&V and certification costs and related 
programmatic risks can provide a basis against the development and implementation of new capabilities 
[39].  Such obstacles against innovation pose a threat to national competitiveness and can hinder the 
proposed operational improvements to the National Airspace System (NAS) that are intended to increase 
capacity and flexibility and reduce costs, but would also increase the complexity of airborne and ground 
aviation systems [40].  There are initiatives underway to produce methods, tools, and techniques that enable 
predictable, timely and cost-effective complex systems development [41].  NASA aims to identify risks 
and provide knowledge to safely manage the increasing complexity in the design and operation of vehicles 
in the air transportation system.  For this, multidisciplinary tools and techniques are being developed to 
assess and ensure safety in complex aviation systems and enable needed improvements to the NAS. 
1.2.   Purpose 
This document is an initial contribution to a design guide intended to provide insight into the system 
safety domain, present a general technical foundation for designers and evaluators of safety-relevant 
systems, and serve as a reference for designers to formulate well-reasoned safety-related claims and 
arguments and identify evidence that can substantiate the claims.  That evidence forms a basis for 
demonstrating compliance with certification regulations, and its generation is a major objective of a system 
development process.  This work is part of an effort to enable sound assurance of safety-related properties 
of computer-based aircraft systems by developing an effective capability to model and reason about the 
safety implications of the system requirements and design.   
1.3.   Approach 
The approach selected for the design guide is to present a summary of major theoretical and practical 
considerations relevant to the design and evaluation of safety-relevant computer-based systems.  The 
presentation leverages a unified abstract model of system safety applicable globally and locally at every 
level of a design hierarchy to ensure that the material is intellectually accessible to a broad audience with 
the wide range of knowledge and experience on system development and safety.  This is accomplished, in 
part, by leveraging the general concept of a system throughout the presentation and using technical concepts 
and terminology from computer science and engineering only where needed to ensure clarity.  The aim is 
to simplify the description of the domain and offer sufficient insight to enable the identification and 
definition of evidence needed to support explicit claims that the system safety risks are acceptably low.  
This document provides basic foundational material for the design guide in the form of an overview of 
concepts in system design, lifecycle, and safety.  This document is also a survey of major and influential 
research and engineering publications in these areas.   
Future sections of the design guide will introduce a general safety-risk mitigation strategy based on the 
application of rigorous development processes to minimize the likelihood of design errors, and system 
architectures that can mitigate residual logical defects and physical faults.  The concepts and safety 
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implications and considerations of functionally integrated and distributed systems will be reviewed, 
followed by an overview of system-safety risk assessment.  The guide will also offer insight into various 
particularly complex and consequential aspects in the design and development of modern safety-relevant 
computer-based systems. 
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2.   System Design, Lifecycle, and Safety 
This section presents an introduction to basic concepts that provide foundation, background, and 
motivation for the rest of the document.  It begins with an overview of basic aspects of the design of a 
system.  This is followed by a review of important system lifecycle concepts, including topics such as 
concept development, requirements, and system architecture.  The section ends with an overview of system 
safety.   
2.1.   System Design  
An engineered system is an entity with a purpose that is achieved by the interactions (i.e., relations) of 
its internal components (i.e., sub-entities) with each other and with the external environment (i.e., 
surroundings).  A system is defined by a boundary (i.e., border) which delimits the extent of the system 
and is where the system interacts with its environment.   
The concept of system is circular and recursive.  In general, both the environment and the components 
of a system are themselves systems.  The system of interest (SOI) (or system in focus) is identified by its 
boundary.  An SOI is always contained within a larger super-system (or meta-system) which includes the 
SOI and its environment.  An SOI also contains sub-systems which are sub-sets of internal components 
and their interactions.  This recursion is bounded above and below based on relevance to the problem or 
matter under consideration.  This system hierarchy has a tree structure with the super-system composed of 
the SOI and its environment at the top, and each sub-system branch is decomposed into one or more layers 
of sub-systems until atomic components (or items), whose internal structure is irrelevant or unknown, are 
reached at the bottom. 
The purpose of an engineered system is defined in terms of the desired effect on the environment.  This 
effect is achieved by the flow of matter, energy, or information between the SOI and its environment.  An 
SOI can have different kinds of sub-systems such as mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, thermal, electrical, 
electronics, human, and computer, as well as combinations of these, which interact to achieve the system 
purpose.    
Henceforth, the focus of this guide will be on digital computer systems embedded in larger engineered 
systems.  A computer system is a data processing system (DPS) whose primary inputs and outputs are 
data sequences.  A computer sub-system interfaces with other kinds of sub-systems to achieve the desired 
overall purpose of the containing domain system.  The environment of a computer consists of other sub-
systems as well as the environment of the domain system. 
2.1.1.   Environment  
The environment of a system of interest can be divided into three parts.  The external systems are the 
set of external entities that directly interact with the SOI at its boundary [42].  The context is the set of 
external entities that have a significant influence on the SOI but are not themselves directly influenced by 
the SOI.  Beyond the external systems and the context is the rest of the environment which has little or no 
influence on the SOI and is thus considered outside the scope of relevance to the purpose of the SOI. 
2.1.2.   Function, Behavior, and Service 
The engineering function of a system is what the system is intended to do [23], and it is described in 
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terms of inputs, outputs, and the relations between these.  In general, the system inputs and outputs are 
sequences (or flows) of data items.  Each data item in a sequence is characterized by a value and time of 
occurrence.  The data items of a system are carried by input, output, and internal variables (or signals).  
The mathematical function of a system is the relation between the values of input and output variables 
of the system.  The behavior of a system is the functional and temporal relation (i.e., value and time) 
between the inputs and outputs of the system.     
There are three basic types of behaviors.  A transformation behavior changes the values of input 
variables into new values at the output variables.  A storage behavior buffers the values of input variables 
until some future point in time when they appear at the output variables.  A transfer (or distribution) 
behavior simply transfers the values of input variables to output variables.  In general, the behavior of a 
system is a combination of these basic behaviors intended to change the attributes (i.e., what, when, and 
where) of data items. 
The service delivered by a system is the output flow as perceived by its users.  A user is a system or 
entity that receives a service.   
2.1.3.   Structure 
The structure of engineered systems is generally hierarchical consisting of a set of internal composite 
and atomic components, their containment relations, and interconnections.  The structure of the system is 
what enables it to generate the intended behavior [23].  Every component has a particular behavior, and the 
hierarchical composition of these internal behaviors results in the intended top-level system behavior1.   
The internal structure of computer systems can be generically described as a hierarchy of computation 
nodes that perform data transformation and storage functions, and a communication capability that transfers 
data between nodes (see Figure 1).  Non-atomic nodes are composite sub-systems that contain internal 
structures that can also be described with this generic pattern of computation and communication 
capabilities, as illustrated in Figure 1.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
1 Note that this relation between the external behavior of the system and its internal structure is especially significant 
for safety-relevant systems because as the complexity of the desired system functionality increases, the complexity 
of the behavior of the internal system components and their interrelations also increases. 
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2.1.4.   Informational, Logical, and Physical Layers  
A computer system, whose purpose is to process data, can be viewed at three basic levels as illustrated 
in Figure 2.  This is a simplified version of the models described by Avizienis in [43] and Parhami in [44].  
In the informational layer, the system handles data which is processed to accomplish the purpose of the 
system.  The function of the system is achieved by its internal logic, which performs combinations of the 
basic operations of transforming, storing, and transferring data.  The logical layer is where the computation 
algorithms are described [45], [46], [47].  The informational and logical levels are abstract representations 
of a system in terms of operations performed on data.  The physical layer is the substrate that realizes the 
system in a concrete physical sense enabled by equivalence relations (i.e., mappings) between the abstract 
data and functions at the informational and logical levels and conditions and processes at the physical level 
of the system [48], [49], [50].  The physical level of a system is where actual physical space (i.e., volume) 
is occupied, power is consumed, and heat is generated in the performance of the system functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.5.   Hardware and Software Layers 
A computer system, in the general sense of data processing system, consists of a set of interconnected 
logical components which together perform the intended function of the system.  A typical computer 
Informational Information and Data 
Gates, Registers, ALUs, 
Multiplexers, Processors, 
Memory, Algorithms, 
State Machines, etc. 
Logical 
Transistors, Capacitors, Diodes, 
Resistors, Wires, Other Electrical 
and Electronic components 
Physical 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 Composite nodes 
Node 1 Node i Node N 
Interconnection 
 Computation 
 
 
 
 Communication 
                             
Figure 1: Generic System Structure 
Figure 2: Basic System Layers 
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contains one or more physical devices (i.e., hardware) that perform functions such as input and output of 
analog, digital, and discrete data; data memory; data communication; application-specific data processing; 
and general-purpose data processing [51].  In general, many of these devices have degrees of 
programmability, performed either offline or online, that enable the specification of a desired functionality 
from a range of possibilities based on the particular needs of the application.  This can include devices such 
as programmable read only memories (ROM), gate arrays, field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), semi-
custom standard cell design, and processing units (e.g., microcontrollers and general-purpose and graphical 
microprocessors) [52].  These devices have particular means of programming.  In the case of processors, 
they have instruction sets that specify the units of computation that a processor can perform [51].  Software 
is a sequence of instructions (i.e., a program) stored in memory to be executed by a processor to realize a 
desired function.   
As illustrated in Figure 3, a computer system consists of a hardware layer and a software layer, and the 
logical layer of the system is divided between the software and the hardware layers.  Because of the great 
flexibility and space (i.e., volume) efficiency afforded by programmable processors and software, most of 
the functionality in modern avionics systems is implemented with software running on processors [52].  
Much of the complexity growth in modern systems is happening in the software.  However, the processors 
and other hardware devices are also increasing in complexity, as predicted by Moore’s Law2 [52].    
 
 
 
 
2.1.6.   Logical Processes 
The behavior of a computer system is determined by the logical layer, which is itself a sub-system of 
the computer and is allocated between the hardware and the software.  The concept of a process, defined 
here as a logical component that performs a particular function, has similar definitions in the domains of 
systems [42], hardware [53], and software [54].  Thus, this concept will be used henceforth to refer to 
logical system components.  We will refer specifically to hardware and software processes only where the 
distinction is significant.   
Logical processes operate on data flows, whose items have value and time attributes.  Also, note that a 
logical process may be composed of multiple interrelated sub-processes whose actions must be coordinated 
in order to achieve a desired overall function.  The following sub-sections address various aspects of the 
value and time dimensions of logical processes and the data they manipulate.  
2.1.6.1.   Data Flow 
The data flow pattern of a system is the set of relations in the flow of data from the inputs, between 
internal processes, and to the outputs.  The data flow relations in a properly executing system determine the 
                                                          
 
2 Moore’s Law is the observation that the processing power and number of transistors in microprocessors will 
double approximately every two years (i.e., exponential growth rate) [52]. 
Logical 
Physical 
Software 
Hardware 
Figure 3: Mapping from Physical and Logical Layers to Hardware and Software Layers 
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data dependencies among processes such that the data flows among processes in a particular order and 
each process executes only when it has received the necessary data items.  In effect, the data flow relations 
constrain the relative order of execution of the processes based on the availability of required data [55]. 
2.1.6.2.   Control Flow 
The control flow pattern of a system is the set of relations on the relative sequence and timing of process 
activation as determined by the algorithm being executed.  The control flow relations are based on decisions 
regarding process activation sequences.  The system control flow can include process activation patterns 
such as unconditional sequence, branching (i.e., selection), looping (i.e., repeat a predetermined number of 
times), concurrency (i.e., concurrent execution of multiple processes), and synchronization (i.e., multiple 
concurrent processes wait for each other at a point in their execution before continuing) [42].  Depending 
on the application, there may also be timing constraints such as relative delay in activation between 
processes, the rate of activation of the processes, or the duration of execution of a process [27].  These 
control flow relations between processes establish control dependencies which must be satisfied to ensure 
the proper behavior of the system. 
Data and control dependencies in a system must be managed carefully as they are critical determinants 
of the safety-relevant characteristics of the system, including modes and probabilities of failure. 
2.1.6.3.   State and Event 
The concept of the state of a system has various definitions in different fields of study.  The common 
notion in all of them is that the state of a system at a point in time is the information (about the status or 
condition of the system) that, together with the input, determines the future behavior of the system [56], 
[57], [58], [42].  The state of a variable is its value [59].  An event is a change of state at a point in time 
[57].   
2.1.6.4.   Sequential Machines, Time and Triggers 
A digital computer system, regardless of its design and mode of operation, is fundamentally a sequential 
finite-state machine (FSM) that contains internal memory elements and whose outputs are a function of 
present and past inputs as well as the initial state of the machine [51].  Structurally, a computer system can 
consist of multiple levels of interacting sequential sub-machines.  The data flows in a system at the inputs, 
outputs, and between processes carry information about states and events in the system and its environment.  
Changes in the memory and output of a system are conditioned on the input and the state of the system, and 
triggered by events on the inputs or state of the system.   
An asynchronous sequential machine is triggered (i.e., activated) and updates its state and outputs when 
input events occur.  A synchronous sequential machine is triggered at points in time marked by the output 
of a clock oscillator which can be internal or external to the system [51].  Both asynchronous and 
synchronous sequential machines are triggered by events, and the distinction between the two is whether 
the triggering events are strictly time-based or not.   
From a general perspective, logical processes are triggered by events which can be time-referenced or 
not [57], [58].  An event-triggered process is activated by particular non-time-based events.  A time-
triggered process is activated strictly by time-based events.  These time-based events can be derived from 
logical-time clocks that keep track of the passage of time as indicated by clock oscillators [60], [61]. 
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Process triggering is a consideration related to the control of system execution flow.  The distinction 
between time and event triggering is important because these modes of triggering have different advantages 
and detriments in the problem of coordinating multiple system processes in safety-relevant systems, where 
it is critical that the system exhibit a high degree of predictability even under conditions of failure, 
disturbance, and degradation [57], [58], [62], [63], [64].   
2.1.6.5.   Event Timing 
The timing of events is an important consideration in system design.  The relative offset between two 
events is equal to the real time elapsed between the occurrence of the events.  This can be characterized by 
lower and upper bounds on the offset. 
One significant timing attribute of an event is its periodicity (or recurrence), which is the time T 
elapsed between consecutive instances of the event (i.e., inter-arrival time) (see Figure 4).  Table 1 shows 
the range of possibilities of event periodicity based on the upper and lower bounds of the inter-arrival time.  
The jitter of an event is the difference between the upper and lower bounds of the inter-arrival time (i.e., 
Tmax - Tmin) [58].   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Event Periodicity Levels 
Event Periodicity Inter-Arrival Time 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Periodic (i.e., fixed rate) Nominal T Nominal T 
Sporadic Rate Constrained Tmin Tmax 
Sporadic  Minimum-Rate Constrained Unbounded Tmax 
Sporadic  Maximum-Rate Constrained Tmin Unbounded 
Aperiodic (i.e., unconstrained/unbounded rate) Unbounded Unbounded 
 
Process latency (or response time) is the time duration between activation and completion of an 
instance of execution of a process.  Latency is characterized by lower and upper bounds.  The difference 
between these is the latency jitter of the process. 
If two logical clocks are nominally periodic with the same period, we may be interested in whether they 
are synchronized or unsynchronized (i.e., asynchronous).  The relative skew between two clocks is the real 
time elapsed from the instant one clock makes a particular state transition (i.e., the count reaches a particular 
value) until the other clock makes the same transition [61].  Two clocks are synchronized if the relative 
Time 
Instances of an Event E 
Inter-Arrival Time T 
Figure 4: Inter-Arrival Time 
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skew has a known upper bound which is much smaller than the period of the clocks. 
2.1.6.6.   Value and Timing Uncertainty 
In digital computer systems there can be various sources and conditions of uncertainty (i.e., unknown 
but possibly bounded) in the duration of operations, the timing of events, and the value and time of data 
items.  From the perspective of processing and communication, the workload and latency of a process can 
vary over time, the latency of a logical process can vary for the same workload (e.g., due to data-dependent 
control flow), different processes performing the same computation can have different latencies, the 
communication delay between processes can vary [57], and the drift rate of clock oscillators can vary [61].  
The execution timing of modern processors can be unpredictable due to advanced features such as cache 
memories, pipelining, branch prediction, out-of-order execution, dynamic scheduling, interrupts, multi-
master arbitration of buses, and the use of multiple direct memory access (DMA) engines [65].  Reference 
[66] offers an overview of the problem of estimating worst-case execution time (WCET). 
Digital computer systems are discrete-value and discrete-time systems [67], [52].  From this perspective, 
uncertainties are primarily due to the sampling and discretization of physical analog quantities, such as 
position, speed, angle, and time. The data item uncertainties in the system can be relative to the real physical 
world (i.e., accuracy) or relative between different data items representing the same quantity (i.e., 
precision) [58].   
Another source of uncertainties, both in terms of accuracy and precision of data items, is finite-precision 
computer arithmetic.  The problem of developing algorithms to perform precise computations using finite-
precision arithmetic is studied in the field of numerical analysis [68].  One concern regarding finite-
precision computer arithmetic is that the computation errors vary with the specific mathematical 
expressions used and the order in which they are evaluated.  Thus, even if two processes compute the same 
function, their results can be different in ways that can be significant for particular applications [69], [70], 
[71].  Hall and Driscoll in [72] provide a list of numerical analysis consideration for safety-relevant systems. 
This issue of value and timing uncertainty is an important aspect in the problem of achieving predictable 
interactions and coordination of multiple system processes in safety-relevant systems.  
2.1.7.   Interfaces 
An interface is a link (or point of interaction) between entities.  The purpose of an interface is to enable 
the exchange of information (i.e., communication) between entities.  These interfacing entities can be 
systems or components, as a system consists of components and interfaces at the inputs, outputs, and 
between components.   
We consider interfacing at the physical and logical levels.  Hardware interfaces are a combination of 
physical and logical level interfaces.  Software interfaces are logical interfaces.  Hardware – software 
interfaces link the logical layer of the hardware with the software. 
The scale and complexity of a communication problem is determined by the physical and logical 
attributes of the entities and what lies between them.  A general communication system must deal with a 
complex set of problems such as physical media, signaling, formatting, synchronization, flow control, 
addressing, error management, and routing [73].  Most component communication problems are simpler 
instances of this general problem.   
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2.1.7.1.   Physical Interfaces 
Interfaces at the physical layer3 deal with the mechanical and electrical characteristics of interacting 
components and the communication medium, including considerations such as power, volume, thermal 
properties, voltage and current levels and timing, signaling rates, signal propagation, electrical interference, 
and others related to the physical environment [73], [74].  These interfaces can range from interconnects 
on integrated circuits [49] and printed circuit boards [75] to cables and connectors for interfacing between 
boards, modules, and cabinets [76].   
2.1.7.2.   Logical Interfaces 
Logical components interact to achieve the larger purpose of the system that contains them.  These 
interactions are exchanges of functional and temporal information in the form of states and events related 
to the data and control flows of the system [57], [58].  In modern systems, the interactions can be highly 
complex with intricate patterns of data and control dependencies between components at all levels of the 
structural hierarchy.  The logical interfaces are critical determinants of safety-related system properties as 
they can be sources of uncertainties and also serve as paths for the propagation of effects of value and 
timing uncertainties.  The dependencies between components must be carefully managed to ensure system-
level predictability even under conditions of failure, degradation, or disturbances. 
Hall and Driscoll in [72] provide a list of considerations for system interfaces and environment in safety-
relevant systems. 
2.1.8.   Functional Modes 
A mode of a system is a distinct operational capability [42].  Modes are high-level states that determine 
lower level states and functionality (i.e., algorithms), including state transitions.  An aircraft system may 
have different available operational modes for different operational mission phases and conditions.  The 
components of a system may also have their own operational modes.  Statecharts are an effective means to 
model the mode transition logic of a system [77]. 
Figure 5 illustrates the basic system modes and transitions.  A system’s functionality may not be required 
at a particular point in time (i.e., there may not be a demand for it).  When there is a demand for it, the 
system must first go through an initialization and startup process to reach a state of operational readiness.  
When required, the system transitions to the operational mode where it may have a number of sub-modes 
and mode transition logic.  When the functionality is no longer needed, the system executes an orderly 
shutdown process.   
In general, this basic mode logic applies to a system as well as its internal components.  An important 
system design problem is the relation between the modes of the system and the modes of the components 
and how to properly coordinate mode transitions of system components.  This system design problem is 
critically important in safety-relevant systems, which must achieve predictability at the system level even 
under conditions of uncertainty about the status of the components due to failures, disturbances, or 
degradations. 
                                                          
 
3 Note that the concept of physical layer here is a subset of  the one used in standard computer communications 
theory. 
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Hall and Driscoll provide a number of considerations for initialization and startup in safety-relevant 
systems [72]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.9.   Composition 
The purpose (i.e., the goal) of a system is to have a desired (i.e., intended) effect on its environment by 
interacting with it.  In general, this interaction sets up an interdependence (i.e., mutual dependence) relation 
between the system and the environment such that the intended environmental effect is achieved if the 
output of the system satisfies certain assumptions, but the system can only guarantee properties about its 
output if the environment satisfies certain assumptions (see Figure 6).  Thus, the goal of the system is 
achieved if the guarantees by the system are a superset of the assumptions about the system and the 
guarantees by the environment are a superset of the assumptions about the environment.  These assumptions 
and guarantees cover both the physical and logical layers of the system and the environment.  Proper 
operation requires that the system and the environment restrain their physical and logical actions at their 
interfaces to remain within assumed (i.e., hypothesized) bounds.  Physical layer assumptions and guarantees 
concern physical interaction properties (e.g., mechanical and electrical).  Logical layer assumptions and 
guarantees are functional and temporal (i.e., value and time) properties of data flows.   
The goal of a system design is to satisfy required service guarantees.  These can be functional and non-
functional service goals.  Functional goals concern the input-output response and achieving and maintaining 
certain output conditions.  Non-functional goals pertain to the quality of the service in terms of criteria such 
as reliability, availability, integrity, and performance [42], [59]. 
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Figure 5: Basic System Modes 
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The design of a system consists of the specification of the components and the interaction protocols.  
The assume-guarantee model of interaction also applies at this level.  Thus, the system service properties 
are a result of the properties of the components and the properties of the interactions between them and 
with the environment (see Figure 7).  The delivery of system service guarantees requires that the actions of 
the components and the interaction protocols remain within assumed bounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composition analysis is central to achieving predictable (i.e., guaranteed or ensured) system behavior 
in safety-relevant systems.  Violation of system-level guarantees is the result of the violation of physical or 
logical assumptions about the environment, the components, or the interaction protocols.  Such violations 
cause unintended (or undesired) interactions whose effects can propagate throughout the system and out to 
the external interface.  Predictable system behavior under conditions of failure, disturbances or degradation 
requires that the system design be able to tolerate a bounded degree of uncertainty about the actions of 
individual elements and the number of elements whose actions are uncertain.   
Hall and Driscoll have provided a number of considerations for system temporal composition and 
determinism [72].  Additional information about assume-guarantee reasoning and the related topic of 
contract-based-design is available from Bate et al. [78] and Benveniste et al. [79]. 
Environment 
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about the system 
Guarantees  
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System Assumptions 
about the Environment 
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Figure 6: Assume-Guarantee Model of Interaction between System and Environment 
Figure 7: Assume-Guarantee Relations in System Composition 
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2.2.   System Lifecycle 
This section goes over some of the considerations in the system lifecycle, the high-level design of a 
system, the development lifecycle, and management of the evolution of the system after entry into 
operation.  The system development process is the set of interrelated activities performed to produce a 
system that meets the needs and goals of the stakeholders.   This process should include explicit activities 
to identify the full set of stakeholders, as their needs and goals are the basis for the system requirements. 
The system architecture is the strategy to satisfy the requirements and it is a critical factor in the 
effectiveness of a system throughout its lifecycle.   
2.2.1.   System Lifecycle and Stakeholders 
It is important to take a broad perspective in multiple dimensions when developing a system.  One aspect 
of this is considering the full lifecycle of the system, which covers all the phases in the life of the system 
beginning with the identification of the operational need and ending with disposal after the system is no 
longer needed.  Figure 8 illustrates the phases and periods in the lifecycle of a system [42], [80], [81].  In 
the development period, the operational needs and goals of the stakeholders are identified, system concept 
studies are performed, a conceptual design is selected, necessary technologies are developed, and the system 
is designed.  The pre-initial operational capability period overlaps with the development period and 
includes the production and manufacturing phase of the system, deployment to the operational field, and 
training of operators and maintainers of the system.  In the operational use and refinement period, the 
system sees operational use while production and deployment of the system continues and the system is 
refined based on needs identified during operation.  In the retirement period, the system is no longer refined 
or produced, but operational use continues while instances or parts of it are decommissioned and disposed 
of.   
Another area where taking a broad perspective is important is in regards to the stakeholders.  A system 
stakeholder is an individual or group who has an interest in some aspect of the system lifecycle because 
they are affected by or accountable for the outcome.  Stakeholders can be internal or external to the 
organization(s) directly involved in the lifecycle of the system.  Examples of stakeholders include owners, 
developers, manufacturers, trainers, operators, maintainers, victims (if there is an accident), and 
government regulators.  Every stakeholder has a different perspective on the system lifecycle and different 
needs and goals.  Stakeholder identification, analysis, and management is crucially important because their 
needs, goals, values, capabilities, and constraints influence every aspect of the system lifecycle [81], [82].  
The system is intended to satisfy the needs of the stakeholders.  The success or failure of the system will 
be decided by them. 
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2.2.2.   Operational Needs Analysis and Concept Development 
The origin of an engineered system is a perceived need (or opportunity), either current or projected, in 
the operational domain of an organization.  The purpose of an operational needs analysis is to identify and 
characterize operational capability gaps (i.e., deficiencies) relative to the goals and values of the 
stakeholders.   Operational needs can arise for various reasons such as change in goals, conditions (e.g., 
product obsolescence, change in the operational environment), or regulations, and availability of new or 
more effective capabilities enabled by new technology.  Note that the broader notion of system, as a set of 
interacting elements with a purpose, applies to organizational operations.  Thus we will refer to this as the 
operations system, which may have technological (e.g., machines and tools) and human elements with 
machine-machine, human-machine, and human-human interactions within the system and between the 
system and its environment.   
A number of tools can be used for the needs analysis including operational tests, experiments, and 
modeling and simulation.  Qualitatively and quantitatively indices (or measures) of performance (IoP) 
relevant to the goals and values of the stakeholders can be used to measure operational effectiveness and 
efficiency.  Examples of these include operational cost, delays, and processing capacity, as well as quality 
measures such as safety, availability, reliability, and flexibility.  Systems-based approaches can be 
leveraged in assessments of operations systems.  Examples of these approaches include hard systems 
thinking, system dynamics, and soft systems methodology [83].  Gibson’s systems analysis approach is 
another means of gaining insight into operational problems, as well as developing candidate solutions [84].   
Systems Engineering handbooks by NASA and MITRE offer additional approaches and guidelines for the 
assessment of operational needs [81], [85]. 
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Figure 8: System Life Cycle Phases and Periods 
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The next part of the operational needs analysis is determining whether a technically feasible and cost 
effective solution exists.  This involves the exploration of the problem and solution spaces to identify and 
develop a plausible concept of operations (ConOps), which is a description of an envisioned system and 
operations that satisfy the needs of the stakeholders.  Kossiakoff et al. [86] describe a structured approach 
for concept development.  IEEE Standard 1362-1998 is a guide for documenting ConOPs [87].  A fully 
developed ConOps considers the needs of all the stakeholder groups and covers the full lifecycle of a system 
from development to retirement and disposition [42].  A ConOps describes operational scenarios in the 
environment of a system of interest (SOI) and serves as the basis for defining the boundary and required 
major capabilities and attributes of the SOI.  Domain knowledge, insight into the stakeholder needs, 
awareness of technology and capability options, and creativity are critical factors in the development of an 
effective ConOps.  A concept of operations may also be referred to as a concept of execution. 
2.2.3.   System Requirements  
The system requirements capture the needs and goals of the stakeholders for the SOI.  As the purpose 
of a system is to achieve a desired effect on its environment and an overall performance level in the 
operations system, the SOI requirements are primarily statements about phenomena in the environment in 
the form of monitored inputs and controlled outputs by the SOI.  Part of the system development effort and 
operations system analysis is to determine the SOI inputs and outputs and their relations such that the 
desired overall operational goals are achieved.  The effectiveness of the requirements in realizing the 
operational goals is dependent on known properties and assumptions (i.e., hypotheses) about environmental 
processes.   
There are a number of ways to structure the system requirements.  The three basic categories of 
requirements are functional (i.e., behavior in interaction with the environment), non-functional (i.e., 
attributes, qualities), and design constraints (i.e., limits on the design of SOI) [88].  Examples of non-
functional system requirements include reliability, maintainability, usability, safety, availability, flexibility, 
producibility, testability, disposability, and performance (e.g., throughput, reaction time, size, speed, 
weight).   
Buede describes a thorough and insightful category structure for requirements in which, for each system 
lifecycle phase, there are input/output, technology and system-wide, trade-off, and qualification 
requirements [42].  Input/output requirements include descriptions of valid inputs and outputs, functions 
(i.e., input-output relations), and external interface constraints.  The technology and system-wide 
requirements are constraints and performance thresholds on physical system resources, including 
technologies to be used (or not used), qualities (e.g., reliability, availability, safety, maintainability), and 
lifecycle cost and schedule.  The trade-off category of requirements are decision algorithms used for 
comparing and selecting among design alternatives relative to performance and cost.  Trade space 
exploration and decision making use the trade-off requirements combined with an objectives hierarchy, 
which is a hierarchical structure of performance and cost objectives expressed in terms of qualitative and 
quantitative figures of merit (FoM) with relative weights, valid ranges, and utility (i.e., value) curves as 
determined by the stakeholders.  The qualification requirements specify the plans for validation, 
verification, and acceptance of the system by the stakeholders and the data to be gathered in support of 
assessments of quality for the developed system.   
Requirements engineering is the discipline concerned with the elicitation, evaluation, specification, 
and quality assurance of requirements [59], [85].  The system requirements are generated in an iterative 
process of interaction with stakeholders.  As illustrated in Figure 9, requirements engineering operates in a 
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cyclic process of exploration and discovery in which additional requirements are identified and generated 
based on new domain knowledge, followed by a quality assessment activity to ensure the effectiveness of 
the revised requirements set.  Assurance of requirements quality is about detecting and correcting defects 
by means of inspections, reviews, simulations, and formal analysis.  Requirements validation activities 
check the requirements set against desired extrinsic properties aimed at ensuring completeness and 
adequacy, while requirement verification activities ensure desired intrinsic properties such as consistency, 
unambiguity, traceability, feasibility, and verifiability (i.e., be able to check that the developed SOI meets 
the requirements).  Requirements engineering is also responsible for monitoring the stakeholder needs to 
identify changes over the lifecycle of the system and generate suitable requirements as the basis for 
refinement and evolution of the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional information on requirements engineering is available from many other sources.  Hall and 
Driscoll have a list of questions to ask regarding system requirements [72].  The FAA has published a 
Requirements Engineering Management Handbook [89].  The following sources also have useful 
information on requirements engineering: [59], [81], [85], [86], [90], [91], and [92]. 
2.2.4.   System Architecture 
The system requirements are the goals to be achieved by the system, and the system architecture is the 
high-level strategy to achieve those goals.  The IEEE defines architecture as “the fundamental organization 
of a system embodied in its components, their relationships to each other, and to the environment, and the 
principles guiding its design and evolution” [93].  As a set of interacting components whose properties are 
integrated through the interactions, the architecture provides the link between the system assumptions and 
the required system-level properties (i.e., emergent holistic guarantees).  The architecture describes not only 
how the functional requirements are satisfied, but also the non-functional quality requirements [94].  The 
architecture must account for the full system lifecycle, from development to disposal [42].  The architectural 
description should include the structural relationships as well as behavioral aspects of the components and 
their interactions to ensure that the system will work as intended [95].   
The architecture also serves as a means to reduce the complexity of a system design problem.  A design 
Consolidated 
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Figure 9: Basic Model of Requirements Engineering Process 
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process consists of four basic activities: abstraction (i.e., generalization and omission of irrelevant details); 
decomposition (i.e., hierarchy; partitioning; reduction of an object into smaller and simpler parts); 
elaboration (i.e., adding detail, either structural or behavioral (functional or temporal)); and decision 
making (i.e., selection among alternatives) [96].  Decomposition can be horizontal (i.e., breakdown into 
multiple modules at the same level of abstraction) or vertical (i.e., breakdown into multiple modules at 
sequentially lower levels of abstraction).  With vertical decomposition (also referred to as layering), every 
layer receives a cohesive set of services from the lower substrate layers and provides more abstract services 
to the layers above [97], [98].  In addition to abstraction and decomposition, other classical complexity 
reduction techniques include regularity (i.e., decomposition into regular structures with similar 
components), modularity (i.e., decomposition into components with particular well-defined functions and 
interfaces), and locality (i.e., information hiding and use of mainly local variables) [49].  Reusable 
architectural patterns can also be used to solve recurring design problems and manage the complexity of a 
system [99], [100].    
One approach to develop a system architecture is to decompose the problem into the development of a 
functional architecture and a physical architecture which are combined as an allocated architecture [42].  
The functional (or logical) architecture is an arrangement of system functions, their decompositions, and 
interfaces, and the definition of control and data flows at internal and external functional interfaces.  The 
physical architecture is an arrangement of physical resources for computation and communication, their 
decompositions, and internal and external interfaces and their physical constraints.  The allocated 
architecture is a complete system architecture with the mapping of functions to physical resources that 
implement them.  In the case of a computer system, the functional architecture could be an application-
dependent software architecture and the physical architecture could be a computing platform consisting of 
hardware resources and an operating system.  The advantage of this approach is that the design problem is 
decomposed into major manageable parts whose development can proceed concurrently, though not 
completely independent as there are relations between the functional and physical architectures which must 
be actively managed during the development process. 
Architecture design can be viewed as a decision-making process [101], [91], [102], [103].  These 
decisions are broad in scope and concern system-level properties captured in the requirements.  
Architectural decisions also pertain to guiding principles for development and evolution to ensure system-
wide conceptual integrity over time [103], [102].  At each level of architecture development, decisions are 
made about how requirements will be satisfied, and these decisions result in particular mappings of 
requirements to the next level in the hierarchical decomposition.  These architectural decisions are often 
made under uncertainty about operational conditions and about the implications of the decisions as the 
system development advances.  Experienced engineering judgment is required to mitigate the risks to the 
development effort and the operational effectiveness of the system.   
Bass, Clemens, and Kazman list a number of advantages of architectures, particularly software 
architectures, including: predicting system qualities, enhancing communication with stakeholders, defining 
constraints on implementation, allowing incorporation of independently developed components, enabling 
reasoning about and managing change, and influencing organizational structure [94]. 
Additional information and insight into system and software architectures is available from Maier and 
Rechtin [104]; Bass, Clemens, and Kazman [94]; Buede [42]; NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [81]; 
and the Guide to the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge [105].  Cleland-Huang et al. describe the 
relation between software requirements and architecture [106].  Koopman has developed a taxonomy of 
decomposition strategies [107].   
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2.2.5.   Development Lifecycle 
The need to develop a system has its origin in identified operational deficiencies and/or awareness on 
the part of the stakeholders about technological opportunities to enhance operational performance with the 
introduction of new or more sophisticated capabilities.  As described above, the path to realizing this 
potential operational improvement begins with an analysis of operational needs and the development of an 
operational concept.  After this, the boundaries for the system of interest (SOI) are defined and the system 
requirements are generated describing the interaction between the SOI and its environment to achieve the 
desired operational outcomes.   
The system requirements are, in effect, the definition of a technical engineering design problem to be 
solved and stated in terms of functional, performance, and quality goals and constraints.  The complexity 
of a technical problem can vary depending on the number and diversity of stakeholders and their needs. 
The solution to a technical problem can range from a trivial one-possible-solution exercise to highly 
complex and multi-dimensional problems with multiple possible solutions and requiring active engagement 
by the stakeholders throughout the design process to ensure a satisfactory solution.  This later case is the 
most general and most relevant to modern complex systems. 
Solving complex system design problems involves a combination of rational analytic approaches (i.e., 
science) and experience-based intuition (i.e., judgment, design “art”) [58], [104].  Gibson’s Systems 
Analysis methodology offers insight and guidance into general goal-centered analysis and synthesis for 
complex systems problems [84].  This requires the definition of performance criteria, generation of 
alternative solutions, and ranking and selection of alternatives based on their performance.  In general, 
arriving at a complete system solution is fundamentally an iterative and recursive decision-rich analysis 
process of decomposition that generates a hierarchical tree structure of simpler but interrelated sub-
problems and continues along each branch until sub-problems are reached which can be solved whole, at 
which point the lower-level solutions are composed along each branch until the top-level problem is solved.  
Iteration is required in complex-problem solving to correct decisions that lead to inadequate results or 
unintended consequences.  From a structural system perspective, this problem decomposition corresponds 
to components, interfaces, and interactions at different levels of abstraction.  Thus, the design problem 
solution is a hierarchical structure of decisions ranging in scope from global system-level decisions to low-
level decisions about components and interfaces. 
Although it is known that the final complex-system solution will have hierarchical structure, there is no 
deterministic process by which to arrive at the final satisfactory solution.  There are at least two reasons for 
this.  First, the development of requirements is an iterative process of discovering and refining the 
stakeholder needs.  In general, the basic needs can be derived from the operational concept, but the 
generation of a comprehensive and accurate set of requirements is complicated by the fact that the priorities 
of the stakeholders change over time and the IKIWISI (I’ll-know-it-when-I-see-it) syndrome, which means 
that the stakeholders must interact with prototypes or early versions of the system in order to discover their 
requirements [108].  The second reason is that complex, interdependent, and potentially conflicting system 
requirements can lead to significant uncertainty about the implications of high-level decisions.  This 
requires an iterative process to refine the requirements and discover a satisfactory solution.  The design of 
complex systems is a wicked problem as it exhibits the characteristics that the problem is uniquely 
dependent on the specific characteristics of the environment, the problem cannot be defined independently 
of the solution, and there are no clear rules for when a final solution has been reached [58].  The complex-
system solution must seek a balance between conflicting requirements, especially performance and quality 
requirements.  Thus, there is significant degree of subjectivity and uncertainty in solving complex system 
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problems.  Also, usually there is no single satisfactory solution, there are multiple decision paths (i.e., 
sequences) to arrive at a solution, and most decisions have the potential for unintended consequences.  
Complex systems typically fail because of unintended and unanticipated consequences of requirements and 
design decisions.   
The decision to develop a system is based on cost and benefit considerations.  The costs are the funds 
and time allocated to develop the system.  The benefits are related to the degree to which the technical 
performance of the acquired system meets the needs and expectations of the stakeholders, while complying 
with applicable standards, guidance, regulations, and policies.  These cost, schedule, and technical 
performance considerations are assessed based on estimates (i.e., models) of the acquisition processes.  As 
with all models, these estimates are based on assumptions about required resources and the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the development process.  Thus, risks (i.e., uncertainties and related potential undesired 
consequences) on attainment of cost, schedule, and performance goals must also be considered in 
development feasibility analyses.   
A structured and managed development process is needed to ensure a successful development project.  
Figure 10 illustrates a simple high-level model of a system development project in which cost and time are 
“consumed” to transform the needs of the stakeholders into a system with the required level of technical 
performance.  For this, a Development System of people, technology, and processes (e.g., methodologies, 
techniques, and tools) with certain level of capability and maturity [109] is engaged to develop the SOI.  
The relation between project cost, schedule, and technical performance is determined, in part, by the 
complexity of the technical problem and the capability and maturity of the development system.  The 
management of a development project includes activities of planning, coordination, measuring, monitoring, 
controlling, and status reporting to stakeholders [91].  The project management function can be divided into 
two major sub-functions: project control and systems engineering [81].  Project control is responsible for 
activities such as planning and management of the schedule, system configuration, resources, and 
acquisition.  Systems engineering is responsible for system design, product realization, and technical 
management, including planning, control, assessment, and decision analysis.   
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Risk management is a project management process responsible for the identification, assessment, and 
generation of mitigation actions against cost, schedule, or technical performance risks.  The solution of 
unexpected problems during the development process typically requires tradeoffs among cost, schedule, 
and technical performance.  The overall system development process should be managed to ensure that 
risks diminish and are minimized as the development advances toward completion.  For safety-relevant 
systems, it is critically important that the technical performance of the developed system satisfy the 
requirements with high confidence (i.e., low uncertainty).  Two important risk considerations in the 
development of a system are the readiness (i.e., maturity) level of the technologies introduced in the system 
(i.e., Technology Readiness Level, TRL) and risks associated with software development, which are caused 
by factors such as inadequate understanding of operational requirements and system interfaces, and lack of 
sufficient qualified personnel [92].   
Feiler has identified two main points of concern in the development of embedded systems [110].  One 
of these problems is the potential for multiple truths in the results of system analyses.  Loose coupling 
among system development teams and between development and analysis activities can lead to 
inconsistencies between models of different aspects of a system and also between the system being 
developed and the one captured in analyses.  The second main problem of concern in the development is 
the introduction of errors early in the development process and their discovery much later during the 
integration of components or system-level testing.  This is a concern because, in general, the cost of 
correcting errors increases exponentially with the distance in the development process between the point 
where they are introduced and the point where they are identified [110].  This is because both the breadth 
and depth of implications of design decisions increases as the development process advances.  One 
significant source of errors and inconsistencies are mismatched assumptions about different aspects of a 
system.  Assumptions of different sorts are leveraged to simplify and bound the design and analyses efforts, 
but for complex systems, successful development critically depends on the use of a consistent set of 
assumptions by everyone involved.  Another source of development errors is the inability to identify and 
to understand all the implications of design assumptions and decisions.  The difficulty in doing a thorough 
and precise examination increases with the complexity of the system. 
Additional information and insight into the system development lifecycle, including risk management, 
is available from multiple sources [92], [81], [86], [111], [91], [105], [112], [113].  Information on readiness 
levels for technology, integration, and systems is available from [92], [114], [115], [116].  Information on 
formal contracts for systems design is available from [79].  Information on decision analysis is available 
from [42] and [81].  Hall and Driscoll have checklists for configuration management and organizational 
factors [72].  Goossen and Buster recently completed a study that identifies issues and makes 
recommendations to enhance the state-of-the-practice in regulatory compliance for avionics development 
in multi-tier supplier networks [117].   
2.2.6.   Refinement and Evolution 
The requirements and design of a system is based on assumptions, expectations, and best understanding 
of stakeholder needs and the current and future environment in which the system will operate.  For a 
complex system with complex requirements and design, perfection is unattainable and there are no means 
to show with complete certainty that a fixed final design will meet the stakeholder needs over the full system 
lifecycle.  Instead, the decision to transition to production and deployment is based on an assessment of 
whether a satisfactory level of technical performance and expected lifecycle costs has been achieved and 
the operational impacts of any remaining shortcomings can be accepted as-is or adequately mitigated.   
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One way to manage initial development deficiencies or limitations and future changes in stakeholder 
needs is with refinement and evolution of the requirements and design over the system lifecycle.  The 
changes to a system can be anticipated and planned for at the time of initial development, or the changes 
can be due to conditions that were not anticipated during initial development.  System changes can be 
reactive or proactive to correct defects or to enhance technical performance.  The system requirements and 
configuration management processes are critical enablers of post-development design changes by ensuring 
a thorough assessment of impact, feasibility, and implementation.   
Additional information on product refinement and evolution (i.e., upgrades and modernization) is 
available from multiple sources.  The Guide to the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge has extensive 
guidance on requirements change management, software maintenance, and configuration management [91].  
Lamsweerde has insightful information on requirements change control and traceability management [59].  
Other sources include [81], [92], [105], [86], [111], [113], [80], and [118].   
 
2.3.   System Safety 
There are various definitions of safety and related concepts.  Avizienis et al. define safety as “absence 
of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the (natural) environment” [23].  NASA uses the definition 
in MIL-STD-882 where safety is defined as “freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, 
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the (natural) environment” 
[119], [120].  Leveson defines safety as “freedom from accidents or losses” [34].  Ericson offers several 
definitions of safety, including “the state of being safe”, where safe is defined as “the condition of being 
protected from danger, mishaps, or other undesirable consequences” [121].  Definitions of an accident 
include “an undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily unexpected) event that results in (at least) a 
specified level of loss” [34], and “an unplanned event, or events, that results in an outcome culminating in 
death, injury, damage, harm, and/or loss” [121].  MIL-STD-882 defines a mishap as “an event or series of 
events resulting in unintentional death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the (natural) environment” [120].  So, MIL-STD-882 equates mishap with accident.  
The FAA uses slightly different definitions in the context of aviation safety, where mishap is “a source of 
irritation, annoyance, grievance, nuisance, vexation, mortification … a minor accident”; incident is “an 
unplanned event that could have resulted in an accident, or did result in minor damage”; and accident is 
defined as “an unplanned fortuitous event that results in harm, i.e., loss, fatality, injury, system loss” [122].  
Based on these definitions, safety is concerned with events or conditions with various degrees of severity 
in terms of loss or damage to people, property, or the natural environment.  Henceforth, we will refer to 
these safety-relevant events or conditions as mishaps.   
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It is generally impossible in the real world to guarantee the absence of mishaps.  Thus, safety is better 
defined as “the state in which risk is acceptable”, where risk is defined as “the combination of the frequency 
(or likelihood) of an occurrence and its associated level of severity” [25].  This risk of mishaps is known as 
safety risk.  Figure 11 illustrates the relation between the risks of events and the boundary risk, which is 
the upper limit of acceptable risk.  From the perspective of designing a system, the boundary risk is the 
maximum allowed residual risk when the system is in operation.  The acceptable risk level varies with the 
needs and values of individuals and societies, as well as the practicalities and cost of achieving a particular 
level of risk (i.e., it is the result of implicit or explicit decisions based on cost-benefit assessment) [123].  In 
general, the boundary risk defines an inverse relation between the likelihood (or frequency) and severity of 
mishaps.  Note that the uncertainty about future occurrences must be commensurate with the required upper 
bound on the likelihood (or probability) of an event.  The lower the required probability of an event, the 
higher the certainty (i.e., confidence) must be that the event will not occur.   
The concepts of safety and safety risk are assessed based on a model of a system, defined previously as 
a set of interacting components with a purpose.  As safety pertains to physical damage, the system in 
question is a physical operations system with human and/or technological components (e.g., machines and 
tools) interacting with each other and with a physical environment.  Mishaps are the result of a chain of 
causality that extends from root (i.e., initiating) causes to mishaps.  A hazard is “a condition, event, or 
circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event” [122], where the relevant 
unplanned or undesired event here is a mishap.  Ericson defines a hazard as “an existing system state that 
is dormant, but which has the potential to result in a mishap when the inactive hazard state components are 
actualized” [121].  In general, other conditions in the system or the environment are necessary for the 
activation of a hazard (i.e., the propagation of effects in the form of a chain of events) and the occurrence 
of a mishap.  Hazards are defined with respect to a physical operational system and its environment.  
Hazards are not necessarily root causes but can be intermediate conditions in a causal chain.  The 
identification of hazards is the result of decisions based on multiple factors, some of which may be 
subjective, including the ability to describe the hazards clearly and concisely, allocate responsibility for the 
hazards in the context of a system development or sustainment process, and effectively manage safety 
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engineering activities [124].  The selection and definition of hazards is also based on considerations of 
observability and controllability of safety-relevant events or conditions.  The severity of a hazard is the 
worst-case possible mishap what could result when other conditions are at their most unfavorable [34].  The 
safety risk of a hazard is the product of the hazard severity, likelihood of occurring, exposure (i.e., 
duration), and likelihood that the hazard leads to a mishap.  The exposure condition is a critical risk factor 
as the longer a hazard remains present, the more likely that other required conditions will happen (i.e., time 
coincidence) and trigger a mishap.   
The risk of a particular mishap can be mitigated by manipulating its causal chain to reduce the frequency 
of the mishap, its severity, or both (see event E in Figure 11).  The mishap model can be reduced to a 
sequence of three elements: hazards  mechanisms  mishap, where mechanisms represent the means 
of propagation of hazards effects.  Based on such a mishap model, there are four categories of risk mitigation 
actions [34].  The most effective risk mitigation action is hazard elimination, which results in an inherently 
safer system.  This is also known as design for minimum risk [122].  The next risk mitigation alternative is 
hazard reduction, which reduces the likelihood of a hazard by increasing controllability of the system 
state, introducing barriers to prevent the coincidence of reinforcing hazardous conditions, and making a 
system more robust to prevent individual hazards from occurring.   Hazard control can be achieved by 
reducing exposure and by containment of effects by passive means or by reactive means involving detection 
and activation of suitable mechanisms to limit the propagation of effects.  Hazard reduction and control 
involve the incorporation of passive or automatic technological devices to enhance safety by and providing 
warnings in case of unsafe conditions.  If this is not possible or practical, the next option is to introduce 
personnel procedures and training to prevent and manage hazards [122].  The last risk mitigation alternative 
is damage minimization by ensuring that potential victims of a mishap are protected from its effects (e.g., 
by keeping non-involved workers or the public away, or by operating in remote environments such as a 
desert).   
The safety threats are the set of physical processes or phenomena that are causes of system hazards.  
Endogenous hazards are caused by factors inherent to the system, such as design defects or operational 
procedures [34].  Exogenous hazards are caused by phenomena external to the system, such as lightning.  
The set of relevant threats is determined based on knowledge of the domain, past experience, standards, or 
as required per regulations or policies.   
The assessment of safety risk in the physical operations system is based on models of the system and 
assumptions about operating conditions.  The system models must take into account epistemic 
uncertainties due to modeling abstractions and lack of knowledge about the system and its environment, 
and also aleatoric uncertainties due to inherent randomness or variation in the physical system and the 
environment.  In general, the uncertainties in a computer-based system are primarily due to its complexity, 
which is a function of the number and variety of components and the intricacy of their interactions.   
There are two basic types of safety analyses.  Inductive analyses begin with the hazards and proceed 
forward along the chains of causality toward the mishaps.  Deductive analyses begin with mishaps and 
proceed backward toward the hazards.  These complementary analyses can be used to develop insight into 
the dependency structure and the hazard-effects propagation mechanisms of a system.   
Safety analysis can be qualitative (i.e., subjective and non-numerical) and quantitative (i.e., applying 
mathematical methods), with qualitative analyses performed early on in the development process when the 
system exists mostly as a concept or high level abstraction, and quantitative analyses performed later when 
the design is sufficiently refined to use reasonably accurate quantitative measures.  A safety assessment 
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must include an examination of confidence in the results (i.e., the claims) to ensure their validity based on 
the methods, tools, and techniques used, the supporting arguments, and the available data (i.e., evidence), 
which itself can be a mix of qualitative or quantitative items.   
The safety goal in the design of an operations system is to ensure that the safety risk does not exceed 
the acceptable boundary risk.  As illustrated in Figure 11, given the severity S of a possible mishap, the 
boundary risk determines the maximum acceptable frequency (or likelihood) F.  Using deductive analyses, 
it is then possible to allocate risk (i.e., allowed events and frequency) to the various elements in the 
operations system.   
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 12, the operations system, where accidents can happen and operational safety 
risk is assessed, consists of a number of subsystems (SS) including our computer-based system of interest 
(SOI).  The SOI requirements, including functional, non-functional, and design constraints, are defined 
taking into consideration the contribution of the SOI to safety risk in the operations system.  Henceforth it 
is assumed that the intended (though not necessarily the actual) SOI functional and performance 
requirements are safe in the sense that the SOI will not cause a mishap if its delivered service is in 
compliance with the intended requirements.  SOI safety then is about (service) failure events in which the 
SOI fails to meet its intended service and fails to deliver service or delivers an unintended service (i.e., 
the delivered service deviates from the intended one).  An SOI failure is a hazard in the operations system.  
The non-functional safety attributes (or qualities) of the SOI capture the safety risk requirements covering 
the failure modes (i.e., the hazards) and maximum frequency of occurrence for each.  As illustrated in 
Figure 13, the system safety design problem is how to design the SOI to deliver the required functions with 
the specified safety-related quality attributes under stated threat conditions.  The threats are the causes of 
SOI failures and can be endogenous or exogenous to the SOI.  As stated previously, the system architecture 
is the high-level strategy to achieve the goals of the system (i.e., the requirements).  These three concepts 
of system architectures, safety-relevant qualities, and safety-relevant threats will be examined further in the 
future sections of the design guide.   
Additional information on safety, system safety, risk, and safety-relevant system properties for systems 
and software is available from the sources referenced above as well as the following documents: [28], [125], 
[126], [127], [128], [129], [130], and [131]. 
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Figure 12: System of Interest SOI as Part of the Operations System 
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3.   Final Remarks 
This document presented an overview of system design, lifecycle, and safety.  The document is intended 
to be part of larger design guide for safety-relevant computer-based systems.  The next report in this series 
will address the topic of system-safety threats. 
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